Ports on the edge: why the next generation of giant ships already has a problem before it sails

The shipping industry is weighing another jump in vessel size. After settling on 24,000 TEUs as the benchmark for intercontinental routes, several leading carriers are now looking at 27,000 TEU ships, a class larger still. China already proved the jump is technically feasible. In 2024 it unveiled a 27,500 TEU design with dual-fuel LNG propulsion, with approval in principle from classification society DNV. The ship, however, was never built. The motivation is purely financial. Spreading fuel, crew and insurance costs across more containers per voyage lowers the cost per box. That math pushes major operators to keep pace. The problem is that no one yet has anywhere to dock a ship that size.

What 27,000 TEU ships demand on land

A vessel of that scale needs drafts and dredging that very few ports in the world currently have. It also requires cranes with a vertical and horizontal reach that most terminals lack. The unload is so massive and simultaneous that it saturates container yards and jams rail and road access the moment the ship docks. There is also a risk that used to be spread across several smaller vessels. Maneuvering a giant like this through a narrow channel or in bad weather concentrates an enormous insured value in a single voyage. A minor accident can block a strategic route or shut down an entire terminal for days.

Fewer capable ports, more concentration in fewer hubs

The direct consequence is that the list of ports able to receive these vessels shrinks even further. It is already short today with the 24,000 TEU class. That concentrates intercontinental traffic in a handful of hubs. From there, cargo moves to the rest of the world on smaller ships, via transshipment. Ports that manage to invest in draft and cranes cement their role as a regional node. They capture traffic that used to be spread across more terminals. Those that cannot fall permanently into the role of feeder port, dependent on whatever connection the nearest hub offers. Maersk and MSC have spent years consolidating ownership of those terminals and feeder fleets. That gives them additional control over the final leg of the chain, something that carriers without that integration do not have.

What this means for Colombian foreign trade

No Colombian port will ever receive one of these 27,000 TEU ships, and that was never the relevant question. What matters is something else: cargo moving through Cartagena, Buenaventura or any other national port increasingly depends on a handful of regional hubs. They are the only ones capable of handling this new generation of vessels. The fewer hubs remain in the equation, the fewer connection alternatives that cargo has. If one of those nodes gets congested, raises its handling fees or loses a call, that cargo is left with no nearby alternative. Carriers gain efficiency on the main trunk route, moving more containers per voyage between major ports. That efficiency does not automatically translate into the same thing for Colombian importers and exporters. Their cargo still depends on a transshipment leg that keeps concentrating in fewer hands.

Fenix tracks these carrier scale decisions closely. They end up defining, months or years ahead of time, which transshipment routes will remain viable. They also determine which routes will fall behind for cargo moving to and from Colombia.